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In this introduction, we present an overview of rural development as an
ideology and as a practice. We argue that as a practice, with some signif-
icant exceptions, it does not achieve its ostensible goals. We conclude that
this failure is the" result of the incompatibility both between different goals
i
and between the goals and the means which are almost universally promoted as
the ways to achieve rural development. This incompatibility is concealed by a
rhetoric which asserts the mutual interests of rural development; agencies,
governments and rural populations en masse- This rhetoric of common interest
i . .
obscures tfte reasons for failure. ,,
i
! ' i
By 'rural development1 we understand planned change by public agencies
based outside the rural areas. These agencies include national governments,
acting alone, and international organisations acting in association with them.
These agencies generally represent development as an impossibility without
their intervention. The literature on rural development is full'of statements
i
implying that, if external intervention did not take place, there would be no
, I
I |
'development1 at all (Hunter, Bunting and Bottrall, 1976 for example). This
is certainly not true. It does not take into account the remarkable expansion
in the production of crops for export and for domestic markets by African
producers acting on their own initiative (Hill, 1963; 1970; Berry, 1970;
Coulson, in this volume,• ;for example). However, this is not whax the promoters
i
of rural development have in mind when they urge 'development1. ;'Development1
is an activity of governments, not of peasants. Rural development is under- .
taken for peasants, not jby_ them (Williams, in this, volume). \
Uma Lele, writing for the World Bank, defines rural development as:
... improving living standards of the mass of the low-income
population residing in rural areas and making the process of
their development self-sustaining (Lele, 1975; 20).
•; - 2 - - ;
i Few people would disagree with so evidently worthy a goal: the problem is how
; to achieve it. There is a very substantial measure of agreement between
external agencies regarding the solutions to this problem. This is expressed
in a major recent World Bank policy document as follows:
Since rural development is intended to reduce poverty, it must be
clearly designed to increase production and raise productivity. Rural
development recognises that improved food supplies and nutrition,
together with basic services, such as health and education, not only
directly improve the physical well-being and quality of life of the
rural poor, but can also indirectly enhance their productivity and
their ability to contribute to the national economy. It is concerned
with the modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with
its transition from its traditional isolation to integration with the
national economy (World Bank, 1975a: 3). . I
i •
It is assumed in the World Bank and elsewhere that increasing productivity
and production for the market will (a) improve the welfare of the,rural poor
and (b) at the same time increase their contribution to the 'national
i j
economy1. This contribution is evidently thought to have been restricted
by their supposed 'traditional isolation*. Poverty is assumed to|be the
consequence of such isolation, not the consequence of the relationship of
the African peasantry to the national, and international, economy; This
view denies peasants their history. It ignores their contribution, past
t !
• i
and present,- to financing industrial investment and state institutions in
I "••, ' |
.;• Africa, as well as in Europe and North America. It assumes that peasants.
• '-,'•; i • • !
-,' can do little for, and by, themselves. j
• - ; i
';'' Enhancing the contribution of the rural poor to the national economy
[ becomes the means by which rural development is to be achieved. Thus those
involved in rural development are concerned to increase agricultural
production to supply urban and international markets. They are concerned
to earn foreign exchange and to extract revenue to finance public, and
private, consumption and investments. This is not necessarily compatible
- 3 -
i with the interests of rur,al producers. One certainly cannot attribute to
the international and government agencies an unambiguous commitment to the
rural population, especially the rural poor whose interests the agencies
have publicly undertaken to support (World Bank, 1975a; I.L.O., 1977a).
International organizations represent and work through 'governments who in
most cases do not represent,- their peoples and certainly not the poor
peasants' (Malik, 1979). International organizations and foreign governments
are not simply sources of finance and personnel for rural development. They
are also the agents, and sometimes the instigators, of international develop-
ment policy as represented in the Lome Convention, UNCTAD and in the
! i
discussions on the new international economic order, which cover such issues
•I as the terms of exchange between raw materials and manufactures, the trans-
fer of technology, lifting trade barriers,and international debts' and
; i
liquidity (Williams, in this volume). Governments negotiate with governments,
agencies negotiate with governments, neither negotiateiwith peasants.
, ... . ' I •.• i. . I
There are clearly important differences of interest between national
: • ' • i
governments' and international agencies. The terms upon which rural develop-
i . ' !
mem projects are agreed are the subject of negotiation between them.1
 i
National governments must respond to the interests of various local groups,
i . i
who may seek special privileges for themselves, protection from foreign
competition or an increase in government spending. These demands may conflict
with the policies and requirements of international agencies (Payer, 1975).
National governments and international agencies also have interests in common.
They . all generally want political stability, the maintenance of the
international economic order, the export of commodities to supply foreign
industry and overseas consumers or earn foreign exchange, the provision of
cheap food for the cities, crucial to foreign aiid domestic employers, and
foreign earnings to repay development loans and other debts. In many
countries state revenues, local and foreign investments and the expansion
of the domestic market all depend on the maintenance of agricultural
production for both domestic and export markets. In this volume, Beckman
< . - 4 - • .
i . •
! shows how the interests of international capital and the successive govern-
ments of Ghana were served by peasant cocoa producers in the 1950s and 1960s,
but he argues that these interests have now diverged.
It is not always easy to reconcile the interests of national and inter-
national agencies. Perhaps the most obvious example of conflict is over
tariff and exchange rate policies. It is much harder to reconcile the interest
of either of them with those of the rural population. Furthermore, the
interests of the rural population are far from homogeneous. Some rural groups
or classes may align themselves with the interests of governments and state
officials against the rest of the rural population. Others may resist the
' i . ! .
attempts of external agencies to implement policies against their interests.
]
Nevertheless, external development agencies consistently present rural
development as an activity in the interests of all concerned (except, perhaps,
middlemen) (World Bank, 1975a: 40).
It is central to the argument for redistribution with growth I that growth
•j ' j
is not necessarily opposed to. more egalitarian income distribution, and that
it is possible to improve the incomes of the poor without reducing the wealth
and incomes of the rich (Chenery, 1974; I.L.O., 1972; cf. Leys, 1973; 1975;
< i
Weeks, 1975). Examples can be cited of countries where a land reform was
followed by industrial expansion, such as Taiwan and South Korea, and growth
was combined with increasing equality of incomes (Chenery, 1974: 280-290).
In this volume, Heyer argues that in Kenya high rates of growth achieved in
i
'. the 1960s and early 1970s went together with the maintanance of the living' •
- standard of the majority of the poor. "However, these examples cannot be
generalised to the circumstances more common to underdeveloped countries
where,according to a recent I.L.O. study in Asia,capitalist development and
increased agricultural production appear to have led to the impoverishment
of the majority of the rural population (I.L.O., 1977). This also appears
• to have been true in different periods for many parts of Africa (Palmer and
Parsons, 1977; Roberts & Shepherd in this volume).
i - 5 - . '
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The assertion that .rural development serves all, or almost all, interests
i
is a necessary myth. The open recognition of conflict threatens the whole
strategy of rural development as currently pursued. It also threatens the
practitioners working for governments and international agencies, many of
whom are sincere in their own concerns for the poor. The need to present
rural development as serving the interests of all concerned leads to the
adoption of the language of 'participation' and. strategies to secure the
cooperation of the rural population for whom development projects are deviled.
The language of participation is, at best, patronising. Rural development
agencies see themselves as developing, indeed 'animating1, rural people who
are accused of being the obstacle to their own development, or unable to
grasp the benefits of development until exposed to persuasion that it is,
indeed, in their interests (World Bank, 1975a: 45; Hunter, 1976: 47; cf.
Coulson and Roberts in this volume). Where terms like 'participation* and
'partnership* are used, it is clear that the rural population are the most
subordinate of partners. The idea that rural development might be initiatec
i
by the rural population itself does not enter the conception of 'rural
development'. Indeed, where the rural population takes an organized
initiative of its own accord, its activities are distrusted by external
agencies to such a degree that they are suppressed, diverted, or pre-empted,
The Ruvuma Development Association in Tanzania, a strikingly successful
initiative from the rural population and one of the original models for
ujamaa, came to be' regarded as -a threat to government and was eventually
banned (Coulson, in this volume). Adams (also in this volume) describes-
how the farmers of Jamaane in Senegal formed a peasant association and
hired an agronomist, whereupon they came into conflict with the irrigation
development authority upstream and its plans for them. This dilemma is
. recognised in the World Bank: ' ;
The manner in which early participation is to be achieved and
balanced.with the need for overall guidance and control from the
center, is a problem which can only be resolved within each country
(World Bank, 1975a: 37). :
i
Participation seems .to mean getting people to do what outsiders think
X 'is good for
rv
them. 'Overall guidance and control from the centre* defines
the relationship between agencies of rural development and peasants. It
excludes peasants' conceptions of their own development (cf. Adams, in this
volume). When agencies interfere too much with the lives or goals of
peasants, peasants may seek;to circumvent them. Barnett, in this volume,
describes how farmers on the Gezira scheme divert irrigation water from
cotton fields to food crops (see also Coulson in this volume). Such resist-
ance leads.governments and agencies to impose further controls. \ Wallace,
in this volume, describes how failure to comply with the requirements of th<;
Kano River irrigation scheme led officials to demand the power to exercise
sanctions bver recalcitrant farmers. I
i : y I
i « !
What, then, are the conflicts between the interests served.by'rural
development1 and those of peasant producers? The overwhelming majority of
' . 1
rural producers in tropical Africa are still peasants: they control the
means of production and use family labour, increasingly supplemented by
j
•• i
wage labour, to produce their domestic consumption needs both directly and
; •• i
by exchanging the products of their own labour on the market. ;As Williams
argues in'this volume, there are distinct advantages to peasant production
as far as governments are concerned. Peasant production supplies food and
raw materials relatively.cheaply. It also provides a source of revenue which
is used to develop the rest of the economy. However, peasants are also a
problem because their ownership of the means of production and of subsistence
gives them a degree of independence. They may be in a position to refuse to
supply particular markets, or to agree to supply only on terms that are
relatively favourable to them. Moreover, peasant production conflicts with
the establishment of capitalist farming enterprises. Capitalist enterprise
depends on the existence of a class of wage labourers separated from the
means of production. The main source of such labour in Africa is the
peasantry. Capitalist farmers also compete directly with the peasantry for
land, for wage labour and the means of production.
;
 : - - 7 - !
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As we have seen, one of the major means of achieving rural development i:j
to increase production for the market and improve productivity. It is too
often assumed that these processes can be grafted on to 'subsistence*
production at no cost to domestic consumption or income. Methods for
improving the production of staple crops, such as millet, have often been
neglected in favour of the commercial crops that are supposed to increase the
peasants' cash income. But the latter is only an improvement if the volume
and quality of domestic consumption does not suffer. It will do so unless •
enough land is available for both and unless more labour is available which
can be deployed without any loss to subsistence production. • It is also too
often assumed that a head of household can shift around the labour of his
dependents at will. Indeed, sometimes this problem is not considered at all.
Domestic labour (the labour of men, women and children standing in specific
social relationships towards one another) cannot be shifted around from one
task to another. Husbands cannot always force their wives to take on extra
-:•• tasks, although such tasks are sometimes done by women for wages; outside the
i •. ' . • i
household. Nor, even though female labour in Africa has sometimes been
i • I
ignored or dubbed 'unproductive1, can households afford to divert women
from such tasks as child-care, food processing and trading whether such
activities are the whole or only part of women's contribution to the main-
tenance of the household. In order to take on new activities and maintain
subsistence consumption, households may be forced to take on more wage
; i
labour, thus increasing their costs of production,
A shift to staple crops with higher yields to labour time, such as maize
or cassava, may be possible, although not necessarily desirable. The main- •
tenance of local markets in staples might also improve levels of consumption
in the rural areas. Production for local rural markets can be important
sources of increased income and higher standards of living through
specialisation and exchange as they were in many areas in pre-colonial times.
' Yet the decline of local market production has often been encouraged. The
procedure of classifying all production passing through local markets as
- - 8 - !
;
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(subsistence production, for national statistical purposes, is common in
African countries and indicative of the disdain in which these local markets
A ure Meld. The tendency is to run down production for local murkcu in tin-
•| process of encouraging production for urban and international markets. This
A
?t tendency has been a major factor responsible for severe food shortages and
!| famine in several African countries in the 1970s. Decline in local and1
$ regional markets, a process often originating'duriny the colonial period, iiu:
1
been the cause of famine in food-deficit areas (Shepherd and Heyer, in this
volume). Moreover, the discouragement of local trade in favour of urban
markets and centralised marketing boards has been to the disadvantage of
many peasant producers to whom trading represents an important part-time
activity and additional source of income (Heyer, in this volume, referring
to Cower., 1979). '»
Since the 1930s, governments have both initiated co-operatives and
i
incorporated them into centralised state marketing systems- Originally
these were intended mainly for export crops, but increasingly governments
have intervened in internal food marketing. They have by-passed local
market systems, have required farmers to grow crops for, and preferred in,
urban markets in order to move food out of the rural areas and have created
1 '•
lucrative black markets for favoured traders (Harriss, 1979; Adams, in this
i [
volume). i |
i
Peasants are forced to sell-to the market in order to earn cash which
is required, in increasing quantities, to provide for the necessities of
life and to pay taxes (Bernstein, 1978; Cowen; and Roberts in this volume).
They may be able to enter the market on relatively favourable terms under
certain conditions. These are when new markets become available for
relatively high-value export or industrial crops, such as cocoa or tobacco,
and when taxation on such commodities does not amount to a disincentive.
Such conditions also exist when peasants can produce a variety of crops for
which there is a market and therefore respond to price advan/At&es, or where
there are alternative markets for their products. For example, groundnut
: . 9 -
producers in Nigeria have been able to avoid the low prices offered by the
marketing boards by selling on the domestic market (Hogendorn, 1970). It i.i
this option which governments in a number of countries have sought to
exclude by creating state marketing monopolies (Coulson; Heyer in this volune)
Producers of export crops have held up sales to foreign companies and marketin
boards as in Ghana in the 1930s (United Kingdom, 1938), or more recently in
Senegal, but such hold-ups are difficult to organise .and sustain.
In order to benefit from cheap peasant production, governments and
i
foreign companies need to control the conditions under which peasants sell,
or even produce, their crops. The problem is, however, that they do not
j • i
control directly the land or labour-power of the peasants (Williams, in this
volume). Rural development projects provide one means of soliciting or
forcing peasants to conform to the requirements of outsiders. Barnett (197?
and in this volume) shows how the control of irrigated land on the Gezira
scheme is used to force peasants to produce cotton, rather than food for
consumption and sale. This 'transformation1 approach, in the form of large-
i
scale settlement, irrigation and outgrower schemes, involves direct control
of peasant production by external agencies. Nearly all transformation
programmes involve large-scale capital expenditure whether on machinery and
i
equipment or on irrigation, land improvement or infrastructure. = Producers
accept a high degree of control over their farming systems including the
timing of operations, the quality of operations, the use of purchased inputs
and the choice of sales outlets and payment systems. The whole package must
be attractive enough to start with to get participation, but once a producer
is committed there is a substantial loss of independence, and the benefits of
the whole package may become less and less favourable to him.
The experience with large-scale irrigation and settlement schemes in
tropical Africa has generally been very poor, particularly with regard to
production. Apart from the Gezira, most large schemes have failed to meet
even basic production goals, let alone any of the other goals of the agencies
- 10 -
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or the rural population.. Several simply collapsed, most notoriously the
T&nzanian groundnut schemes and the Niger Agricultural Project (Wood, 1950;
Frankcl, I960; Baldwin, 1957). Very similar programmes, however, arc still
being implemented (Wallace, 1979,and in this volume). It is frequently the
case that the high investment and administrative costs of irrigation and
settlement schemes, as well as of other forms of intervention, have had the
effect of making peasant production more expensive without bringing
significant improvements in the peasants* standard of living (Wallace, CouJ t>o
Heyer in this volume). The recently developed outgrower schemes seem more
likely to be successful in production terms. In these, international
companies with 'nucleus estates' control the production of plantation crops
on small rural holdings under conditions which come near to relegating
rural producers to the position of wage labourers (Marcussen and Torp, 1973;
cf. Cowen, Heyer, Williams, in this volume). . j
I ' • '
As an alternative to direct coercion, rural development programmes ma/
• • !
offer a package of inputs and welfare services in order to solicit increased
I
production. These include rural water supplies, improved housing, health
services, nutrition and child-care advice and even programmes to 'integrate •
women into development (World Bank, 1975a,b,d,e; Lele, 1975: 20; Coulson in
this volume; Palmer, 1979; cf. Roberts,' 1979). Inputs include the new
technologies which are heavily reliant upon seed, chemical fertilisers,
pesticides and herbicides and even tractor services and hired labour, all of
which must be purchased or obtained on credit. The whole package induces
peasants to rely more heavily on the market both for their means of subsist-
ence and for their means of production and to become increasingly dependent
upon bureaucracy for supplies and services despite the inefficiency of the
bureaucracy and the vagaries in the supply and t'ransport of foreign manu-
factures, leading among other things to further opportunities for the
development of black markets.
- 11 -
It is an important purt of the external agencies' concept of rural
lopnent that they believe that peasants are more or less rational and
efficient wi thin their traditional environment, which is seen a.-- static,
but when faced with new opportunities peasants are conservative, tradition-
alist and unable to respond rationally (World Bank, 1975a, 12, 45). This is,
of course, ridiculous and it ignores all the evidence of peasant innovations
in crops and production methods (Forrest, Coulsoii in this volume). Such a
view reflects a refusal to recognise that only too often the imported tech-
nology offered to peasants has been useless, and sometimes positively
detrimental (Coulson, in this volume). Peasants are more competent in their
physical and social environment than most experts. They may experiment with
and exchange information about new techniques and then reject .them. New
techniques may be rejected because they fail to increase yields, or only
increase yields at the cost of increased labour which peasants cannot provide
or buy, or because equipment falls apart. New techniques may also be
accepted, but used for purposes which were not intended (Roberts, in this
volume). It -almost seems to.be the belief of the external agencies that
innovations offered to peasant producers are intrinsically viable'because of
their non-peasant origin and the stamp of official approval attached to them.
This belief contributes to the common description of rejection as irrational
i
•resistance to change'. ]
: • !
Peasants are also assumed to be incapable of running the institutions
i
i
appropriate to a 'modern1 economy. 'Rural development1 therefore, involves
the improvement of old institutions, the creation of new ones and provision
i
for training and a career structure for personnel. Such training includes
instruction as to how to communicate with, rural people in order to convince
them that what is being proposed is in their interest, and getting across
information about new and superior ways of doing things. Institutions are
supposed to ensure that means of production and credit are available at the
right ~ixes ar.d that marketing channels operate smoothly and efficiently.
; - 12 -
;Thus, we find the familiaT proliferation and expansion of extension services,
farmer training programmes, credit institutions, marketing and distribution
agencies that have so often come to be what rural development seems to be
about. \
The state and other centralised public agencies play the major role in
organising and controlling the development of the new and expanded institutions
i • • ' ' • .
both because it is argued that this will mak« them more efficient in achievii g
basic production ^oais and> more recently^ because it is argued that the poore:.t
40 per cent of the rural population will be better catered for this way.
Public provision or supervision of institutional development is presented as
the most effective, .and also the only, way of ensuring that the worst ills
of private capital or of 'local' control are prevented (World Dank, 1975a: 3/
It may be true that local control will always operate in favour of one group,
usually the relatively better-off. It is wrong to assume, however, that
public provision has a superior record, as experience with cooperatives,
credit institutions and services in tropical Africa show.
Perceptions of peasant communities as traditional and egalitarian,
•intact social structures' (World Bank, 1975a: 42; Forrest, in this volume)
has justified the introduction of co-operatives, extension services and the
public provision of credit, on the assumption that these benefits will be
spread throughout the community (King; Roberts; Williams, in this volume).
Public involvement in rural institutions has, in most cases, considerably
extended economic differentiation and political inequality (Thoden van
Velsen, 1973; Williams, 1976). The institutions available for carrying
out -ural development are incapable of redistributing resources so that
they ixprove the lives of the rural poor even if they do, at times, hold
bad-: the enterprise of rural traders and wealthier peasants (Coulson, Cowen
ir.<2 '..illiams in this volume). This is now widely accepted in studies of th**
'green revolution1 in Asia and Latin America (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1976: ~
118-26, 306-22; Griffin, 1974: 46-82; 207-209; 232; Pearse, 1977). It is
- 13 -
not yet as widely accepted in the context of rural development in Africa.
The record of cooperatives, extension services and t!ie public 'uuvijlur
of credi- iji African rural development programmes has been di.^ n:;il. There
are cooperatives in which all initiative is stifled by heavy-handed control
from ubove; credit institutions that are hopelessly centralised and ir.efficien
marketing boards creating bureaucracies far beyond those required for their
staled purposes (Tanzania, 1966; JCiny, in this volume). The proliferation t.f
bureaucratic structures associated with rural development appears at first
sight excessive. But it may have a rationale. It may be necessary to
develop extensive communications systems because one is trying to persuade
rural people to do what is essentially against their own interests. It may
be necessary to develop state involvement in rural development to maintain
control over rural populations who see that their interests are not likely
to be served by current development policies* Excessive bureaucracy may
i
also be necessary to ensure market participation on terms favourable to
external agencies. Marketing boards have been justified in that they ensuro
that revenue is appropriated from the rural population (Helleiner, 1966:
152-84). But there is little to suggest that this is in fact how these
excessive bureaucracies and their activities can be explained (Coulson, in
this volume). It may equally well be simply that the state finds them
useful generators of patronage and employment (King, in this volume).
i
We come finally to the question of evaluation. There appears to be
little foundation for.the assumption that the activities of rural development
programmes lead to the improvement of the welfare of the rural population,
let alone the rural poor. Evaluation methods, such as social cost-benefit
analysis, purport to quantify the net costs and benefits consequent on the
particular forms of intervention. As Stewart has pointed out, 'net dis-
counted rates of return' ignore the fact that costs are usually incurred by
seme people, and benefits by others (Stewart, 1975). Peasants, particularly
the poorer peasants, are not usually among the beneficiaries.
\ : - 14 - •
MOST programmes ^re undertaken with totally inadequate knowledge of
such fundamental facts as population, land ant! income distributions, the
ranges of crop yields, the levels of consumption and the quantities of
marketed output at the start or during the implementation of the programme.
Consequently, these are often 'estimated', as an inspection of World Bank
evaluation reports shows (e.g. World Bank, 1977a and b). Average yields
before the programme are underestimated so that 'improvements1 can be
claimed as the product of the inputs provided by rural development agencies
i
(Reynaut, 1975: 36). Average yields after the impact of the programme has
> 1
been felt are likewise overestimated. Agencies take all the credit for
increases in output, but attribute any decrease to other factors. It is
very difficult to measure the net impact on output, let alone-welfare, of
the services provided, and it is impossible to quantify the long-term
effects (Barnett and Coulson, in this volume).' What often gets measured is
simply the volume of inputs: their effectiveness is then assumed. Success
har^been defined in terms such as the number of farmers to whom credit has
been disbursed, or the quantity of fertiliser which has been distributed,
regardless of whether these can be shown to have led to increases in output.
Evaluation is essentially no more than an exercise in the validation of
rural development. This is not necessarily the result of hypocrisy or dis-
honesty on the part of those involved. The distance between the ultimate
goals of rural development and the means to such ends is very great. It is
the means more often than the ends which are the object of evaluation. The
primary goals of a programme may be completely forgotten.
Despite these problems with evaluation, evident failures are diagnosed:
both failures to meet the goals to the desired extent and failures to move
in the direction of the goals at all. The explanations of failure that are
provided are worth considering. Failure is often seen as the result of
problems within rural societies rather than the result of the relationship
between rural societies and the external 'partners' in rural development.
r| j^»j-~^.^-. t.. .'
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Conservatism or traditionalism on the part of peasants or peasant societies
are common scapegoats. Anthropologists are brought in to examine local
factors such as control over labour within the household, or political
authority at village level. Local level explanations accumulate. They ter.d
to consist of little more than a body of anecdotes incapable, of explaining
the general problem of rural development, or even of explaining .with any
conviction the particular problems of the local situations to which they
are addressed. I
. i
i
Alternatively, failure is attributed to 'delivery systems* oc implement-
ation machinery. These are castigated as incompetent, inefficient or unco-
ordinated, and solutions are sought in improving the efficiency with which
i I
they operate and co-ordinating the different institutions involved (Williams,
; '« i
1975). The frequency of failure has led to much public breast-beating,
further investment in research and evaluation, and revisions of strategy^p^
However, the frequency of failure has not yet led anyone to abandon or even
suggest abandoning rural development as currently conceived. The analyses
of failure do not permit the conclusion that there is anything intrinsically
wrong with the methodology of rural development.
There is no single explanation of the failure of rural development
projects, or of the success of some of them. We have argued that rural
development encompasses multiple, and often contradictory, interests. Some
of these may be satisfied at the cost of others. The Gezira scheme did
succeed in producing large volumes of cotton for the Lancashire textile
industry, and more recently for export to China and other countries. It
did so at the cost of preventing peasants from expanding food production for
the internal market (Barnett, 1977 and in this volume). On the other hand,
many projects have not even succeeded in meeting their primary goals such'
as improving agricultural productivity and expanding production for the
market, which are held to be the key to improving the welfare of the rural
population.
- 16 -
In .nosx countries, it now appears as if the promotion of 'rural develop-
ment1 has affected the course of events relatively litile. It has been OIL-
of the Ic'iii significant aspects of the international economic processes
generated by the expansion of capitalism, which necessarily change systems
of peasant production. It has proved possible for peasants to expand their
production of export crops -and increase the output of food for ihe market,
as in Ghana and Nigeria in the early decades of the twentieth Century, witioi
Che intervention of rural development agencies. What was required at that
time was the provision of cheap shipping, railways and roads which gave
producers access to new and expanded markets. In this volume, Meyer and
t
Cowen show a similar expansion of agricultural production for urban and
foreign markets which took place in Kenya in the 1960s and 1970s, to the
benefit of the majority of the population. This appears to have followed
from extensive public intervention in rural production and marketing.
However, what may have been equally important was the renewed availability
of lar.d and the opening up to African producers of new markets.
How then do we explain rural development if it makes little contribution
to achieving its declared objectives, or even hinders their realisation?
In the first place, rural development projects do benefit groups
other than those whom they are supposed to serve. They are now big business,
providing markets, contracts, consuitancies and employment to fertiliser
manufactivres^ construction firms', government officials, international experts
and academics. Secondly, they extend the patronage, authority and control of
governments over rural people and. may also make it easier to tax peasant
production. On the other hand, government interventions may provoke rural
people into resisting government authority and attacking public officials
(Williams, 1976; Coulson, in this volume).
Thirdly, rural development agencies nay simply lack the knowledge and
experience to achieve the goals they set. Their conception of the problems
/ - 17 -
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/ may prevent them from acknowledging this. Peasant producers are usually
>/•$ more knowledgeable than officials and experts about local production
i conditions. Moreover, unlike consultants for international agencies,
peasants have to bear the consequences of error and will necessarily be more-
thorough in their assessment of the advantages of new technologies under the
conditions in which they are provided. New technologies developed outside
the rural areas may increase agricultural production and benefit' peasants.
It is not clear that the costly apparatus of rural extension services or
integrated rural development programmes is necessary to get peasants to
adopt methods of production which will benefit them. !
Rural development agencies are constrained by the institutions through
which they work and the social systems, in which they operate. These instit-
utions are probably unable to provide services cheaply and effectively to
the rural poor, or to redirect benefits away from the better off 'to the
•poorest 40 per cent*, let alone identify the needs and productive potential
of poor people. They are unable to do this partly because the interests of
those who control them conflict with the interests of the rural poor. There
is also the problem that the institutions are inappropriate to serve the needs
: of large numbers of rural poor even if this were in the interests of those
who controlled them,
I Rural development programmes in all their forms share a multiplicity of
I . objectives, some more clearly defined and definable than others, which are
I variously in line with, or in conflict with, the interests of different
I groups. It may therefore be that, at the most general level, persistent
I failure is the result of the contradictions inherent in their activities and
I the impossibility of reconciling, let alone containing, them. It is important
I ' for those whose interests are not currently served by rural development that
I the contradictions be recognised. For the others, there is a considerable
I amount to be gained by obscuring them.
J
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